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It is shown that Eppley and Hannah’s thought experiment establishing that gravity must be
quantized is fatally flawed. The device they propose, even if built, cannot establish their claims,
nor is it plausible that it can be built with any materials compatible with the values of c, ~, G.
Finally the device, and any reasonable modification of it, would be so massive as to be within its
own Schwarzschild radius—a fatal flaw for any thought experiment.
PACS numbers: 04.20.cv, 04.60.-m
Introduction
Physicists (and philosophers and other lay readers of physics) have by and large accepted claims to the effect that
the gravitational field must be quantum mechanical in nature. Remarkably, the evidence for these claims is extremely
thin, and indeed what there is is extremely dubious. For general analyses of the failure to establish the case for
quantization, see Mattingly’s discussion[4, 5], and Calender and Huggett’s editorial introduction[1] to their (2001).
Even though there is little experimental verification that the gravitational field is quantized, it seems that both
physicists and philosophers take very seriously two separate experiments that apparently establish that gravity is
quantum mechanical. Widely cited in discussions of the necessity for quantizing gravity are Eppley and Hannah’s[2]
and Page and Geilker’s[8] experiments. While Page and Geilker do carry out their experiment, the significance of
their result was called into question even before the experiment was performed, by the very person (Kibble [3])
who suggested the experiment in the first place. I will not here discuss their experiment since its significance has
been decisively undermined[1, 3, 4, 5], and because it applies only to one specific version of semiclassical gravity,
semiclassical general relativity.
While Eppley and Hannah’s experiment hasn’t been performed the issue of its significance is more delicate. They
proposed a brilliant thought experiment to demonstrate the invalidity of any non-quantum mechanical version of
gravitation theory that is general relativistic in non-quantum limit. Their detailed analysis is meant to establish
that any non-quantized gravitational theory is inconsistent with either the first signal principle of special relativity,
momentum conservation, or Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. This would be a profound result. I will show however
that their experiment cannot be carried out. In particular, in any experimental situation suitable to producing the
results they require, the device they use to measure these results cannot be built in principle. We might offer therefore,
in analogy with cosmic protection hypotheses that there are no naked singularities, the semiclassical protection
hypothesis that possible inconsistencies in semiclassical gravity are hidden from observation.
The result here presented is important because Eppley and Hannah’s paper in particular has had a significant
impact on all future discussions of the question of quantizing the gravitational field. There are few discussions of the
evidence that gravity is quantized that do not appeal to Eppley and Hannah’s result, and many take their experiment
to have settled the question. Here I will not directly challenge the view that the gravitational field really is quantum
mechanical. Instead I will merely show that one important pillar supporting that view is without foundation. One
important reason to reconsider this experiment is that it gives a misleading picture of what stands in the way of a
non-quantized theory of gravity. Showing that Eppley and Hannah’s method fails may prompt the development of a
different, more successful experiment. And that experiment might itself be a useful pointer toward quantum gravity.
Eppley and Hannah’s Thought Experiment
In 1975 Eppley and Hannah[2] proposed their thought experiment to show that the gravitational field must be
quantized. The experiment uses a gravity wave to measure the position and momentum of a macroscopic body such
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2that ∆px∆x < ~ thus violating the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. The key idea is that a classical wave may
have arbitrarily low momentum and, simultaneously, arbitrarily short wavelength. To find a conflict with quantum
mechanics they couple a short wavelength/low momentum gravitational wave to a quantum system. The gravitational
wave may then be used to localize a particle within one wavelength while introducing vanishingly small uncertainty
into the particle’s momentum.
Eppley and Hannah are well aware that a thought experiment must be in some sense realistic, and they adopt
explicit standards: While the experiment may never be carried out—and indeed we may never even possess the
engineering skill or the raw power to carry it out—it still must be physically possible to do so within the bounds of
the theory employed for the description of the device—in this case the semiclassical theory of gravity. They say,
We want to show that the experiment is possible in principle, in the sense that it does not require any
masses, lengths, or times greater than those of the universe.(64)
and they conclude
Our experiment is fantastically difficult to perform, but nevertheless in principle possible.(67)
I agree with Eppley and Hannah that they need merely show that their experiment is possible in principle. I will
adopt their standard—that they need to show that no “masses, lengths, or times greater than those of the universe”
be required.(64) Still I claim that their experiment cannot be performed even in principle.
We must also keep in mind that the burden of proof lies squarely on Eppley and Hannah. Proposing a thought
experiment requires experimental controls at least as stringent as those on an ordinary experiment. It will not do
to say what the experiment would have shown were it possible to construct in principle. It must be shown that the
experiment really is possible in principle. For well established physical principles, such claims can be established
quite casually. If, for example, a thought experiment requires that the some structure be imagined to have been
built according to standard construction techniques, then we needn’t demand an exhaustive demonstration that the
structure is possible in principle. But for more exotic claims we do. If, for example, an experiment requires some exotic
material, we must demand that it be demonstrated that such materials can be found given our current understanding
of the laws of physics. Suppose we need a stable lump of some quantity of radioactive material. We must then show
that that amount is less than the critical mass for that material.
It is not necessary to show that no thought experiment. Instead we need only show that Eppley and Hannah
have not delivered on their promise to produce such an experiment, or even one that requires only trivial and easily
generated modifications. What follows will establish that Eppley and Hannah have not made good on their claim
that their experiment can be performed. Thus one of the best arguments for the quantization of gravity fails.
I proceed in two stages. In the first stage I show that even if there were a device that succeeded in measuring what
they propose, that would still not show that gravity must be quantized. In the second stage I show that their device
cannot be made to work.
A. Their Argument
I’ll consider the construction of the device shortly. First I lay out their argument. Beginning with a poorly localized
particle of sharply defined momentum Eppley and Hannah consider a gravitational wave scattering from the particle.
They claim that there are two exhaustive and mutually exclusive cases.
Either the scattering event constitutes a position measurement of the particle with a consequent collapse
of its position wave function to a smaller region of localization, or else it is not a position measurement
and does not result in collapse. (1977, 53)
They argue that each of these cases will conflict with well-entrenched physical principles, and hence that the
coupling of a classical field to a quantum field is impossible. They take it for granted that the “first signal” principle
of special relativity holds. That is, they claim that signalling “across arbitrary spacelike distances . . . clearly violates
relativity.”(57) Likewise they appeal to conservation of momentum and to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. There
are two cases to consider.
1. Case 1
Suppose that the gravitational wave does collapse the particle’s wavefunction. Then, Eppley and Hannah argue,
the particle is now localized within one wavelength of the gravitational wave. By determining the point of interaction,
3we can attribute a sharply defined position to the particle and, since we introduced arbitrarily little momentum
disturbance into the system it should still have a well-defined momentum. We are presented with two sub-cases:
either the interaction conserves momentum but the uncertainty principle is violated (since now the particle has well-
defined momentum and position), or if the uncertainty principle is not violated then the interaction does not conserve
momentum.
Of the latter sub-case they say, “If the classical probe gives the particle a very good position localization, then
quantum mechanics implies that the particle is now in a state of very high momentum. If the quantum description
of the particle is valid, then momentum is not conserved, since the momentum of the initial quantum state was very
well defined and the classical probe imparted negligible momentum.”(54-55) This argument has been challenged in
a number of places[1, 4, 5], and I will pursue it only briefly here, first noting that the statement of the uncertainty
principle needs a slight modification. What we can say is that the quantum description of matter implies that the
uncertainty in the particle’s momentum is now greater than it was, and thus the probability of finding it in a higher
momentum state is greater. So also is the probability of finding it in a lower momentum state. This certainly does
not imply that momentum is not conserved.
Subcase 1a.
Quantum mechanics implies at most that the product of the spread in values of the two observables has a definite
lower limit. In other words, in this case we no longer can say, with great precision, what the particle’s momentum
is. It requires another argument to tell us if momentum is conserved in the interaction. We did not really prepare
our particle in an eigenstate of momentum, with ∆p = 0. Rather we prepared the particle with a sharply peaked,
but finitely spread, momentum distribution centered about the measured value. How is this significant? Even in its
initial momentum state, there is a finite probability of scattering into any other momentum state in the absence of
any outside interaction. How does this work? The probability of observing momentum within a small interval d (the
resolution of our detector) of p′ 6= p is given by:
Pφ(p′) ≈ |φ(p′)|2d.
Unless the wavefunction has zero support outside some small range of values, this probability will be non-zero. So to
decide whether momentum is conserved, we need to do more than show that, for this experiment, the initial measured
momentum of the system is possibly different from its final measured momentum.
Now we would have a good case that momentum is not conserved if the expectation value of the momentum changed
during the measurement. I will assume, for simplicity, that the initial distribution is a Gaussian of width d peaked
about p, the original observed momentum. The conclusion of my present argument—that a change in the distribution
of momentum need not indicate a change in the expectation value of momentum—holds for general distributions.
Eppley and Hannah claim that if the uncertainty principle is obeyed then the momentum must change. I have
indicated the most charitable and plausible way I can see to read this claim—the expectation value of the momentum
must change if the the uncertainty principle is not violated. The wavefunction for a momentum space Gaussian is:
φ(p) =
√
d
~
√
pi
exp(
−(p− ~k)2d2
2~2
).
Here k is the wavenumber and d is the width of the Gaussian. The respective expectation values of the momentum
for the new and old wave functions are:
〈p(φ)〉 = ~k and 〈p(φ′)〉 = ~k′.
What can we say about the relation between k and k′? This isn’t at all clear from what has been said so far, but
in effect their relation is the relation between the new and old momentum. But what is that relation? Eppley and
Hannah’s argument relies on the claim that, in order to obey the uncertainty principle, k must differ from k′ by more
than the momentum (divided by ~) imparted by the classical gravitational wave. This claim is false. All that the
uncertainty principle requires is that the width of the Gaussian that modifies the momentum space wave function
must change. This is the factor d in the Gaussian wave packet above. It is thus perfectly consistent with quantum
mechanics to assume that, neglecting the small momentum transfer about which we aren’t concerned,
〈p(φ)〉 = 〈p(φ′)〉.
Thus we have to show something more complicated than the fact that after the gravitational interaction the particle
may now be found in a very different momentum state. Perhaps we could instead show that energy is not conserved
during the measurement. Calendar and Huggett [1] consider this possibility at some length. Roughly the idea is
4that energy conservation during measurement is a problem for any collapse interpretation. Specifically the brief
suspension of the Schro¨dinger equation during measurement implies that we should have very little confidence, during
measurement, in any conservation law derived from this equation. (As opposed to our experimentally very well
justified confidence in energy being conserved statistically.) But whatever one’s feeling about the viability of energy
conservation for collapse interpretations, it should be clear that nothing in Eppley and Hannah’s argument implies
that energy conservation fails for their experiment, since kinetic energy follows momentum. To show that energy
conservation is violated would require showing that its expectation value changes, and we are offered no independent
grounds for that. The lesson here is that merely causing the width of a distribution to change has no bearing on the
location of the mean of the distribution. At the very least, a great deal more argument is required before we can
accept Eppley and Hannah’s claim that “[i]f the classical probe gives the particle a very good position localization,
then quantum mechanics implies that the particle is now in a state of very high momentum.”(154) Nothing in their
analysis supports this claim, and my analysis (under what seems to be the only plausible reading of that claim) of
what quantum mechanics requires strongly supports its denial.
I will therefore assume that if the gravitational wave does collapse the particle’s wave function it localizes it will
preserving its sharply defined momentum state. Would this really violate the uncertainty principle?
Subcase 1b.
The uncertainty principle is sometimes misleadingly presented as a feature of individual particles. The claim is
that any measurement of the position of a particle must introduce uncontrollable changes in its momentum. But,
there are empirically adequate interpretations of quantum mechanics for which these relations are epistemological
and not a fundamental feature of the world. On the de Broglie-Bohm theory position and mechanical momentum
are always well defined. It is not inconceivable on such an interpretation that one could find a way to measure
them together with arbitrary accuracy, but only that a purely quantum mechanical measurement could not. Given
that the viability of a hybrid theory is at issue, we cannot assume that such measurements are impossible. Yet
the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation is empirically equivalent to the standard, Copenhagen interpretation. Similarly
Everett’s relative state formulation of quantum mechanics is empirically identical to the Copenhagen interpretation,
and particles there always have well-defined position and momentum. Thus we cannot assume that sharply localizing
a particle simultaneously in both momentum and position space is inconsistent with the uncertainty principle.
It is therefore more proper to take the uncertainty principle as a statement of distributions of measurement outcomes.
Only the preparation of an ensemble of such particles that, as a group, violate the uncertainty principle should cause
concern. But Eppley and Hannah’s thought experiment—even if it were to work—could not be used do this since
they only have the resources to prepare one particle at a time. To violate the uncertainty principle would require an
interference experiment of some kind—like the two-slit experiment. Eppley and Hannah implicitly agree with this
view, claiming that the uncertainty relations are violated because “a beam of such particles sent through an arbitrarily
narrow slit would show no diffraction effects, contrary to fact.”(55) But their “particles” have such small wavelengths
with respect to their size, that no interference experiment of that kind is possible. Their “arbitrarily narrow slit”
would have to be much narrower than the dimensions of the bodies, and therefore there could be no transmission
through the device, much less scattering effects. Perhaps it will be suggested that this experiment could be done
with smaller bodies that can, in principle, be diffracted. As far as I know, the largest bodies that can be diffracted
have masses on the order of 100, 000 neutrons (a very complicated mesoscopic molecule). Whether this is a matter
of principle is unclear, but at least for the devices considered by Eppley and Hannah, for bodies of this mass, the
radius of the Eppley and Hannah detection device needs to be roughly 1059cm. On the other hand, the radius of the
universe is of order 1028cm. So even in principle we could not detect just one, let alone an entire ensemble of such
particles. One might consider other ways to measure interference effects on macroscopic bodies. Is that possible?
Without giving a detailed method that is possible in principle—the whole point of their article—we cannot conclude
that it is. I believe most would assume that, given the small value of ~, such experiments are impossible in principle.
In any case Eppley and Hannah have not shown that the uncertainty principle would be violated.
Even being able to interfere such macroscopic bodies is not enough. For the experiment to show a violation of
the uncertainty principle, it is necessary that the position space wave function not spread between the time that the
particle is localized and the time it is sent through the diffraction grating. That is to say that, if indeed we have
produced particles with ∆p∆x ≤ ~, there is every reason to suppose that the wave-function will spread again, and
this spreading occurs on very short time scales. In fact, if we have localized the particle so well that its position
wave-function is zero outside of some finite region, then the spreading occurs on infinitesimal time scales. Even
for localization with only high confidence—very low probability to find the particle outside the region—the spread
occurs rapidly enough that to ensure experimental violation of the uncertainty principle would require an additional
measurement protocol unaddressed by Eppley and Hannah, in order to assure that the spreading had no effect on
their experiment. The possibility of such an auxiliary protocol simply has not been established. Normally of course
5one does not need to worry about such issues, but if we are assuming that the experiment only functions when the
gravity wave collapses the wave function of the particle, then we must consider whether properties of that collapsed
state can be maintained long enough to measure them. In the context of a thought experiment, the burden is on the
experimenter to show that all parts of the experiment, including this auxiliary component, are possible in principle.
Eppley and Hannah have not done so. Absent a characterization of the experiment, and good reason to think it would
have an outcome favorable to their claims, we haven’t seen that well-established physical principles show that their
experiment functions as advertised.
There are thus reasons, even in advance of a consideration of their device, to think that their experiment is in
principle impossible.
2. Case 2
Suppose now that, rather than collapsing the particle’s wavefunction, the gravitational wave merely registers the
presence of the particle’s wavefunction. But a measurement of a particle’s wavefunction in this way would allow
super-luminal signalling. For before measurement, one can split the position-space wavefunction of the particle into
two spacelike separated parts. Then one can measure the shape of the wavefunction in one region. Depending upon
whether one finds no wavefunction, the full wavefunction, or half of the wavefunction, one can tell whether someone
else has either measured the other part of the wavefunction (by normal quantum mechanical means) and found
the particle, measured and not found the particle, or not made a measurement at all respectively. Thus there is a
prescription for super-luminal causation. One can (since we are assuming here that collapse is instantaneous) tell
instantly the state of the wavefunction in a spacelike separated region.
Notice again that Eppley and Hannah are working within the “Copenhagen” interpretation of quantum mechanics.
This implies that they believe that measurement is accomplished by reduction of the wave packet of a quantized
particle. So strictly speaking, their argument has nothing at all to say to someone who subscribes to a different
interpretation of quantum mechanics.
But, again on the de Broglie/Bohm interpretation, there is never a “collapse” of the wave function even for normal
quantum measurements. Similarly, it has become increasingly common in cosmological discussions to adopt some
version of Everett’s relative state description of quantum mechanics. There again, all particles always have well-
defined positions and momenta.
3. Conclusions from the argument.
Going along with Eppley and Hannah and assuming that the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is
correct, the most we can conclude from their argument is the claim that either non-quantized semiclassical gravity
violates the first signal principle or a gravitational measurement does collapse the particle’s wavefunction. So even
within the context of a Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, and even if their device could be constructed,
their case that gravity must be quantized would still not be made. We would still need to make the case that the
measurement will not collapse the wavefunction. I assume in what follows then that we are operating under the
conditions of Case 1 . I leave here the discussion of Eppley and Hannah’s argument and turn to a demonstration that,
whatever the argument’s merits, their experiment itself will not work even by their own standards.
B. The Device
I will level four objections against their device. One involving materials, one involving the temperature, one involving
preparations, and the last involving gravity itself. The first three are quite serious and prevent their detector from
functioning the way they claim it should. I doubt strongly that these objections could be overcome in any modification
of their device. The fourth objection is damning, and I show that any modification of their device, to mitigate the
effect of this problem, itself reintroduces the problem. These objections, and the conceptual problems I identified
above, show that their thought experiment cannot be considered persuasive evidence that gravity must be quantized.
One might argue that the first three objections could be met in another universe. That however would itself
require significant argument. Are the initial conditions of the universe contingent or lawlike? I don’t know, and nor
does anyone else. Ernst Mach’s observation that the universe is only given once may not underwrite his sweeping
rejection of any counterfactual claims about its initial state, but his observation is germane here nonetheless. The
issue is whether non-quantized gravity is possible in this universe, so any appeal to alleged facts about universes
in general needs careful analysis that is beyond the scope of this note, and which is not undertaken in Eppley and
6Hannah’s proposal. No reason has been given to suppose that the existence of universes (spacetime manifolds) where
semiclassical gravity is impossible has any bearing on the issue of its possibility simpliciter. I am skeptical of such
a conclusion especially since there are results that apparently establish the consistency of semiclassical gravity in 2-
and 3-d spacetime—the only cases that are mathematically tractable. (See for example Wald’s (1994) discussion[10]
and references therein.)
In any case, the fourth objection cannot be met in any universe with the same ratio of values of c,G, and ~ as ours,
and their relative values seem necessary for the existence of any stable matter at all.
Eppley and Hannah wish to localize sharply a mass that has a precisely defined momentum. They do this by
scattering a classical gravitational wave of very low energy and very low wavelength from the mass. In their Appendix
C. Numerical Estimates, Eppley and Hannah attempt to show that the device can be built—at least in principle. As I
mentioned above, this consists, for their purposes, of showing that the universe contains enough mass, is large enough
and will last long enough. Here is what is required for the experiment:
1. A (small) mass that will be localized using a gravitational wave.
2. A method for giving the mass a small and very well-defined initial momentum.
3. A gravitational wave generator to produce short wavelength, low momentum radiation.
4. A detector array to measure the new trajectory of the gravitational wave to determine the location of the
interaction region.
Requirement 1. is easily enough accommodated. From the earlier part of their article, one would assume an
uncharged particle, a neutron for example, should suffice. Instead, Eppley and Hannah use a 10 gram mass. The
reason for this is that, as they say, “[i]f we wish to keep the detector mass Mtot within limits, we need to make the
masses of the generator and the probed particle as large as possible.”(66) As I pointed out above, we have no hope of
diffracting a beam of “particles” this large. From their equation (A2) (see also [7], chs 35-37), we find that the radius
of the detector R, is linear in the distance of closest approach and inversely as the mass of the object to be localized.
If we use a molecule of mass ≈ 100mp where mp is the proton mass, we find that, rather than needing a detector
radius merely of approximately 1015cm we need instead a radius of order 1037cm. Since the mass of a spherical shell
detector goes like the square of the radius, and their original detector was roughly 1000 galactic masses, we see that
the new detector would mass at least 1047 galactic masses. There isn’t this much mass in the universe even for the
best case estimate. I will leave this issue aside for now and return to the detector actually proposed by Eppley and
Hannah.
C. Materials
The first problem the idealized experimenter faces is one of materials. Because the energy of the gravitational
wave used to localize the particle is so low, the wave itself is very difficult to detect. Eppley and Hannah require
extremely sensitive detectors. They use very loosely bound mechanical oscillators—i.e. masses joined with very weak
springs. How weak? They never say explicitly. We are given that the ground state frequency of the oscillators is of
order ω0 ∼ 10−5sec−1. This gives a ratio of
√
k
m ∼ 10−5sec−1, where k is the spring constant of the oscillator. For
their estimates of the total mass of the detector array, we can conclude that the mass at each end of the spring is
approximately 1 gram. But it may be possible to vary this by an order of magnitude in either direction. What does
this give for a spring constant? For m = 1gm, k = 10−10gm/sec2. This truly is a loosely bound oscillator. Typical
spring constants of the type described by Eppley and Hannah have 10gm/sec2 ≤ k ≤ 1066gm/sec2. The smallest
spring constant I know of is for certain extended polymers where k = 2× 10−3gm/sec2.[6] Considering that c and ~
presumably limit the possible values of spring constants, it is incumbent upon Eppley and Hannah at least to suggest
that their value is possible. Everything we know about springs suggests not only that their value is not feasible, but
that it is not possible even in principle.[11]
D. Materials
The springs pose another problem for Eppley and Hannah. Simply put, the springs are too loosely bound. Or
rather, given how hot it is in the universe, the springs will be too excited to allow the idealized experimenter to
determine if and when the scattered gravitational wave has interacted with one of the springs.
7The detector array envisioned by Eppley and Hannah is a closely packed spherical shell of the harmonic oscillators
described above. For the gravitational wave to be detected, it must interact with one of these oscillators and excite
it in such a manner that its excited state can be distinguished from its normal operating state. (The details of the
following discussion come from pages 61 and 65.) We require that the transition time be known with precision of
order λ/c ∼ 10cm/1010cm/sec = 10−9sec in order that the particle’s position be measured to accuracy ∆x ∼ λ.
To measure the final state of the detector we would need a time of order 1/ω0 ∼ 105sec, much too great for our
purposes. But if the oscillators begin in the ground state we can simply determine whether the state of the detector
is above the ground sate, and that allows a much shorter observation time. Therefore, Eppley and Hannah do not
attempt to measure the energy of the oscillators to great precision. Rather they measure a broad band of energies.
The lower edge of this band is above the ground state energy, but the width of the band is much greater than ω0.
Thus the time required for the measurement can be made as short as necessary. The problem with their argument is
in the assumption that they only need to detect oscillator states above the ground state. In fact, virtually all of their
detectors will be in highly excited states.
They calculate the necessary physical characteristics (and the requisite number) of the oscillators that will allow a
probability of order 1 that the gravitational wave excites one of the oscillators. They find (67) that their detectors
should have linear dimension of order 1 centimeter with period of order 105 seconds. This gives an angular frequency
of ω0 ∼ 10−5/sec. Standard quantum mechanical calculations give the ground state energy of such oscillators as
E0 = ~ω0 ∼ 10−20eV . For a quantum oscillator in a heat bath of temperature T , the expectation value of the energy
is given by:
< E >=
~ω0
2
+
~ω0
exp(β~ω0)− 1
Here β = 1kT , where k is Boltzmann’s constant. Taking T = 2.7K, the cosmic background temperature, we find:
< E >∼ 10−20eV + 10−20eVexp(10−20eV/10−5eV K−12.7K)−1 ∼ 10−20eV + 10
−20eV
exp(10−15)−1 ∼ 10−20eV + 10
−20eV
1+10−15−1 ∼ 10−5eV .
Eppley and Hannah give the expectation value of the energy absorbed by an oscillator from the gravitational wave
as:
< Eabsorbed >= 10
−1moscL
2
osc~G/R
2
detectorλ
2c
Their estimate of the density of oscillators at the detector shell is 10g/cm3, so we can takemosc ≈ 10g. The detector
radius, Rdetector ∼ 1015cm, Losc was given above as ∼ 1cm, and λ ∼ 1cm. Thus
< Eabsorbed >∼ 10
−110g1cm210−16eV sec10−7cm3/gm·sec2
1030cm21cm21010cm/sec ∼ 10−63eV .
Eppley and Hannah’s detector must make the probability of exciting one of the detectors by one increment of ~ω0
of order unity. But with the detectors, on average, in an energy state 1015 times the ground state, we can’t use their
expedient of looking at a wide energy interval the lower edge of which is higher than the lowest unexcited state. For
here we expect lots of the oscillators to be in states higher than < E > (around < E >
1
2 of them). No longer can
finding an oscillator above its ground state establish that it has registered the gravitational wave. Instead, we must
observe the phase characteristics of the oscillators’ wave functions. Now we won’t be able to detect an interaction on
anything like the short time scale required for accurate determination of the interaction time, a crucial component of
the experiment. The experiment fails.
Thus at the current temperature of the universe, there is no way to make the experiment work. One might
suppose that we can simply refrigerate the (million cubic astronomical unit) region of the experiment. This might
work. To make the experiment successful, one would need to cool the region sufficiently that temperature effects are
unimportant. The reference Eppley and Hannah use [7] suggests that we would need to make ~ω0 >> kT so that
~ω0
exp(β~ω0−1)
<< 1. I.e., T << 10−16K. Even within the confines of a thought experiment, such a low temperature
over such a large region seems out of bounds. Moreover, this refrigerator would have to be fantastically large itself.
Could such a device be built in principle? Is there time enough and mass enough to build the refrigerator, and allow
it to work? It is doubtful. Naturally one could wait until the universe itself cools to a temperature of this order.
There are three problems with this suggestion however. First, if the universe is closed—and thus will “bounce back”
at some finite time—the universe should never become this cool. Second, if the universe ever were at a temperature
of order 10−16K, there is no indication that enough free energy would be available to construct Eppley and Hannah’s
device. In any case, we need a concrete argument that shows the possibility of cooling the experimental region before
the experiment can be considered performable in principle.
8There is, moreover, a more conjectural reason to think that temperature will be necessarily too high: The mass of
the device itself may make the springs too hot. The Unruh effect implies that an observer in a gravitational field will
experience a thermal bath of temperature kT = ~a/2pic. A mass constrained to the surface of a sphere experiences an
acceleration given by the surface gravity, since in general relativity the mass is constrained to deviate from its proper
geodesic. A naive application of the Unruh effect therefore implies that each of the detector oscillators experiences
a heat bath due to the mass of the detector array. For Eppley and Hannah’s device, the surface acceleration is
a ∼ G× 1000mgalaxy/1015cm2 so at the surface kT ∼ 10−33. Thus T ∼ 10−17, making the device itself too hot for us
to perform the experiment, even in principle.
E. Preparation
To localize the 10gm test particle in momentum space, with its position uncertainty greater than its linear extent,
requires an auxiliary experiment. For this Eppley and Hannah propose to measure very precisely the momentum of a
proton, scatter it off the particle, and then measure its momentum again.(pp. 66–67) Since the test mass is effectively
infinite compared to that of the proton, we can take the x component of its velocity to be vfxp + vixp = 2vxtm where
vfxp is the final x-velocity of the proton vixp its intitial x-velocity, and vxtm is the x-velocity of the test mass. To
determine these quantities within the lifetime of the universe, and within its observable radius (as Eppley and Hannah
demand for their experiment) requires a diffraction grating of linear extent 1026cm and a measurement time of 1017sec.
For a larger mass, the uncertainty required in the proton’s velocity decreases proportionally to the increase in mass.
The detector extent W & ~/(m∆v) is invariant under changes in test particle mass. The question of whether there is
enough mass in the universe to manufacture such an array, and what effect its mass would have on the remainder of
the experimental apparatus is not a negligible issue. But I will not pursue that question here. Instead let us focus on
their diffraction grating. The required spacing of the scattering centers is d ∼ 10−13cm, and this is tightly constrained
by cosmological considerations.(p66) But this is impossible for ordinary matter. Crystal spacing is of order atomic
radius. For hydrogen R ≈ .37A˚ = .37× 10−8cm or approximately 105 times too great. Again it seems incumbent on
Eppley and Hannah to show that such a preparation is possible given the materials allowed by the laws of physics.
Upshot
I have offered good grounds to believe that Eppley and Hannah’s experiment cannot work. To convince us that
the experiment could be performed in principle, they would need to provide arguments that show: 1) c,G and ~
together allow materials with the requisite spring constants; 2) the entire experiment can be refrigerated sufficiently
to allow reliable detection of the gravitational radiation used in the experiment; 3) appropriate auxiliary measurement
protocols could be devised, and the devices to carry them out could be constructed. Absent these arguments, a new
device could be “constructed”, that is, a new experiment could be performed—one that uses in principle possible
materials and takes into account the temperature of the region of spacetime occupied by the device.
I cannot comment on the possibility of the latter option—a new experiment—but I can say that the arguments
suggested in the former option—establishing the possibility of the old device—is itself hopeless. For, even granting,
as we should not, the in principle existence of their ultra-high-tech materials and super-refrigerators, the experiment
cannot (meaningfully) be conducted. The entire device, it turns out, sits inside its very own black hole.
F. Gravity Itself
1. Their detector is in a black hole
The mass of the detector array is sharply constrained by the demands of the experiment: R must be large enough
that the angular resolution set by the detector elements and the radius together is fine enough; the density of the
detector elements must be such that there is an appreciable probability of a detection event. Eppley and Hannah’s
detector masses approximately 1000Mgalaxy, given by Mtot ∼ R3detector × ρoscillators ∼ 1015cm× 10gm/cm3 (p65–66).
Thus its Schwarzschild radius is of order 1019cm. Since their estimate of the detector’s mean radius is only 1015cm,
the Schwarzschild radius is 10, 000 times that of the detector. But if a mass is contained within its Schwarzschild
radius, it’s inside a black hole. Whatever else we can say about this experiment, it should be obvious that this
is a serious problem. How, for example, does one communicate the results with the outside? Our experimenters,
whatever they observe, are completely cut off from the rest of the universe. Moreover, the gravitational stress-energy
is enormous. The linear approximations Eppley and Hannah use to derive the sensitivity of their oscillators cannot
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black hole, the experimenter would have a real problem establishing the time of interaction. Why? If we suppose that
the gravitational wave propagates out as far as the detector array, we know that it should return to the array rather
than escaping to the exterior of the black hole. The question then becomes, “did it interact with the detector on the
way out or on the way back in?” Naturally this problem presupposes that there is still a detector to consider. Matter
that forms a black hole very rapidly collapses to central region of extremely high density. It is then impossible that
the detector, as such, would survive its own construction.
2. Possible modifications
1. Couldn’t we simply enlarge the detector and avoid the whole problem of gravitational collapse? No. The mass of
the detector as a whole has to increase at least as fast as the square of the radius. Simply put, as the detector radius
increases, the surface area increases and we need more detectors to ensure a reasonable probability of detection. But
the Schwarzschild radius increases linearly with the mass, that is, with the square of the detector radius. So increasing
the radius gets us into worse shape—the detector is further and further inside its own Schwarzschild radius.
2. What about Eppley and Hannah’s suggestion that we can focus the gravitational radiation? If we do that, then
the total mass is an upper limit, and need not reflect the “real” quantity of mass we need to use. The first problem
with this suggestion is that to do so requires even more mass! To focus gravitational radiation, there’s no substitute
for mass. Putting this issue aside for the moment, we can ask how much mass we expect to save through focusing.
Notice that using only a small portion of the detector doesn’t help by itself. For example, if we focused the radiation
into 1% of the detector, then we would need only 1% of the mass. But the effective radius of the new detector (the
radius within which all the mass would lie) is also only reduced to 1% of its earlier value. But we would pick up a
decrease in the required mass density if we could focus all of the radiation into the reduced detector. For we would
need only 100th as many detectors, the density of radiation being increased by a factor of 100. This is really the lower
limit on how much of the radiation we need to focus—a factor of 100 reduction in the mass density would bring us
just outside the Schwarzschild radius.
It is a tricky problem in general relativity to determine if suitable gravitational lenses could be developed for this
application. The problem is that, at least for a spherical focusing mass, the angular deflection of a given ray goes
roughly likeM , the mass of the body, while the capture cross-section for all rays (i.e. the likelihood of being absorbed
by the lensing matter rather than propagated) goes likeM2. ([9], 144.) Thus we reduce the luminosity of the radiation
by absorption faster than we increase its energy density by focusing. Without a concrete proposal for how to focus
the gravity waves without damping out the signal, it is not possible to say that Eppley and Hannah have shown, in
principle, how to keep the mass of the device within physically possible bounds. Simply claiming that one could focus
the radiation does not show that one could really do so. Even co-ordinating so massive a lens with the rest of the
detector—setting it far enough away not to distort the detector, but close enough to produce measurements on usable
time scales—is not clearly possible in principle.
Moreover, the 99% reduction in mass density given above isn’t really enough. As pointed out before, to measure a
violation of the uncertainty principle requires that we observe a beam of particles that doesn’t diffract, even though
the individual members of the beam should—and Eppley and Hannah implicitly assent to this. Thus we need to
reduce the mass-density even further. Earlier I suggested a total mass of about 100 neutrons as the upper limit for
a diffraction experiment. We will see that even 10, 000 wouldn’t be large enough. Suppose we reduce the mass of
the measured object to 10, 000 times the mass of the neutron—yielding a mass of about 10−20gm. Then (see Eppley
and Hannah’s equation C8), the total mass of the detector (in the absence of focusing) becomes 1045 galactic masses.
Ignoring the question of whether there is 1045 galactic masses worth of matter in the universe (there isn’t), we need
now to focus not merely 99% of the gravitational radiation into 1% of the detector, but 10
44
−1
1044 % of it. That is, if we
use the same size sector of the detector, and if we wish to avoid gravitational collapse, we must must not introduce
more than 10 galactic masses into that sector. A massive enough lens to focus all the radiation into such a small
sector is certainly out of the question; a lens that does that without absorbing an appreciable fraction of the beam
energy is, apparently, impossible even in principle.
G. Outlook
Eppley and Hannah claim that their thought experiment would demonstrate the inadequacy of any semiclassical
theory of gravity. I have outlined two separate objections to that claim, either of which alone is sufficient to undermine
it. I have shown that their interpretation of the significance of their experiment is untenable and relies on a narrow and
not unobjectionable interpretation of quantum mechanics. I have further shown that, regardless of how we interpret
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the results of the experiment, the experiment itself cannot be performed—even in principle. Their “experiment” thus
provides no evidence that the gravitational field must be quantized. And thus, one of the most influential attempts
to show that gravity is quantized fails.
I have not claimed that no experiment like the one envisioned by Eppley and Hannah could be made to work.
However I do not see any way to modify this experiment in order to obtain their results. And this experiment, at
least, does not work and cannot be performed—even in principle. Notice that the problems with the experiment are
not particularly subtle; their analysis requires only basic results in quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics, and
general relativity.
Perhaps the above discussion will after all prompt the development of a thought experiment that really would
show the impossibility of non-quantized gravity. Such an experiment is likely to suggest directions for constructing
a quantum theory of gravity. Investigating other possible thought-experiments that rule out non-quantized gravity
models may also lead to experiments that really can be performed at some later date.
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